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linked with the records of our digitally mediated lives, legal distinctions that draw a line between 
communications “content” and metadata are inappropriate and insufficient to adequately protect 
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1 Introduction 
Surveillance in public spaces is becoming increasingly common, whether through state or privately-owned 
closed circuit surveillance cameras, location tracking made possible by GPS chips embedded in virtually all 
cellular phones and many other electronic devices, license plate recognition systems, or even by cameras 
wielded by many of the average people on the street and built into ubiquitous technologies like phones, 
tablets, and computers (Moore, 2010; Rushin, 2011).  In the public spaces of the Internet, our 
communications, browsing histories, buying patterns, and information about our social networks are subject 
to acquisition by government agents for law enforcement or national security purposes.  In our modern 
society, public spaces are increasingly laden with organizational surveillance, where corporations, 
organizations, or governments are the surveillance agents, and non-organizational forms of surveillance 
carried out by individuals (Marx, 2005). Virtually all of this surveillance encompasses metadata, or 
information about the various bits of digital information being created to document our public or private 
lives, and much of this information is being ingested into, and stored in large electronic databases that are 
shared with government agents and marketing companies interested in mining information about us – 
including the attendant metadata – to achieve their respective mandates. 
Recent revelations about covert government surveillance practices in the United States, and in 
allied countries like Canada and the United Kingdom, have vigorously renewed public discussions about 
information and communication privacy. Because of the nature of the surveillance practices at issue, and 
the legal frameworks undergirding government action, many of these discussions have specifically focused 
on whether a person can maintain a legitimate expectation of privacy in metadata – or so-called “non-
content” information – attached to their electronic activities such that the targeted (or even incidental) 
acquisition of related metadata by government agents should be subject to heightened legal protections.  In 
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the United States, our presence in a public space (including online spaces) has generally equated to a waiver 
of any legally enforceable right to privacy for anything we do or say in those places – or in information 
about our physical location – on the premise that such information has been voluntarily disclosed to third 
parties by virtue of our very presence in public itself. 
In this paper, we critically examine the proposition that government access to metadata should be 
subject to lesser legal standards than the actual content of interpersonal communications (i.e., the actual 
words spoken or written by the parties to a communication).  We draw upon theory and literature in both 
law and archival studies, as well as judicial reasoning in relevant legal decisions of U.S. courts.  More 
specifically, we argue that because metadata surveillance can be highly intrusive to personal privacy – even 
more revealing than the content of our communications in some cases – and that certain types of metadata 
are inextricably linked with the records of our digitally mediated lives (MacNeil, 2002), legal distinctions 
that draw a line between content and metadata are inappropriate and insufficient to adequately protect 
personal privacy.  Of course, metadata will not generally give insight into the actual words spoken (or 
typed) in a communication (and thus, in this sense, is less revealing), but it may likewise reveal information 
that the contents might not, such as the frequency of communication between two individuals or other 
patterns of communication.  As such, metadata can be very revealing, and even more so than the actual 
contents if what NSA analysts are concerned about is generally calling patterns, connections, and actual 
contact information (all contained in communications metadata). The high evidentiary value of metadata 
to government law enforcement and national security intelligence operations does provide a counterpoint 
to our argument. To deny law enforcement certain surveillance powers solely because of their efficacy is 
likewise inapt. 
However, that critique is misguided and misses the point of our central thesis.  Under the 
Constitutional commitments in the United States to personal liberty from government intrusion, including 
the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unwarranted search and seizure of personal information by 
government agents, metadata that is inextricably linked to our digital records must be subject to the same 
protections as the records themselves, such as the contents of our communications.  Because modern 
technology has “changed the game” (Moore, 2010) by removing barriers to access and utilize the personal 
information of others, the law should similarly adapt and protect informational privacy when there are 
legitimate reasons to do so. 
2 Metadata 
Metadata is most commonly defined as “information about information,” or “data about data.”  For our 
purposes metadata is human and machine readable assertions about resources.  In our case, resources are 
records in the archival sense, and so come with them particular expectations about metadata.  In the context 
of electronic communications, metadata includes information about the time, duration, and location of a 
communication as well as the phone numbers or email addresses of the sending and receiving parties.  It 
also may include information about the device used (make/model and specific device identification number). 
Metadata is generated whenever we use electronic devices (such as computers, tablets, mobile phones, 
landline telephones, and even modern automobiles) or services (such as email clients, social networks, word 
processing programs, and search engines).  Many of these activities generate considerable amounts of 
information (metadata) about our usage of these devices or services.  In most cases, service providers collect 
and retain this information in databases that often can be traced directly to an individual person. The 
migration of those messages to other systems also generates metadata, depicting the provenance of the files 
as they are copied from one server to another. 
For example, when a person makes a telephone call from a personal phone, electronic records are 
created and stored (by the service provider and/or on the device itself) that indicates the phone number 
called, the time the call was made, and the length of the call.  Information is also created and stored about 
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the physical location of the device when the call was made.  With cellular phones, location can be fairly 
accurately acquired through a variety of methods, including GPS, cell tower triangulation, and the presence 
of nearby WiFi signals (cf. Constandache, et al, 2010).  Landline phones, computer initiated calls, and 
cellular phone calls made over WiFi signals can also often be tracked precisely, due to known locations of 
landline connections and Internet IP addresses.  For purposes of email, metadata might include the time 
sent, the address of the recipient(s), the size of the file, the existence and size of attachments, and the text 
entered into the subject line of the email itself. The header, visible or invisible to the reader is also part of 
the metadata. 
But metadata is not just associated with electronic communications, it also serves to document 
various properties of other facts, documents, or processes.  For example, automated license plate recognition 
systems create metadata about the locations of vehicles at certain points in time. Taking a digital 
photograph often creates metadata about the location the photograph was taken, the aperture, focal length, 
and shutter speed settings of the camera.  Word processing programs such as Microsoft Word can also save 
metadata such as the name of the author who created the document, the date of creation, the date on which 
the latest changes have been made, the name of the user who made the most recent changes, the total 
number of words and pages in a document, and the total length of time that a document has actually been 
edited (meaning: an employer could know exactly how much time an employee spent writing and editing a 
memo). 
3 Metadata and Surveillance after Edward Snowden 
After Edward Snowden leaked classified National Security Administration (NSA) documents to the press 
in June 2013, questions about the nature of government collection of communications metadata took a 
prominent place on the world stage.  Snowden’s first revelation was a classified court order from the secretive 
U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) that compelled Verizon, one of the largest U.S. 
telecommunications providers, to provide the U.S. government with all of its customers’ telephone metadata 
on an ongoing basis – encompassing landline, wireless and smartphone communications.  Other disclosures 
indicate that virtually all of the major U.S. telecommunications companies were subject to similar orders. 
In a Congressional hearing, top U.S. officials claimed that they were only collecting information 
about numbers of the parties to communications (the sender and receiver of phone calls) and the duration 
of the calls.  NSA and Justice Department officials, and high-ranking Congressional representatives, also 
claimed that since they were not collecting the actual contents of communications (e.g. the words spoken), 
the surveillance did not invade anyone’s reasonable expectations of privacy.  The officials claimed explicitly 
that they were not collecting geolocation data (e.g. the location of the device when the call was made or 
received), but nothing in the FISC order limited the government from obtaining this kind of information as 
well.  Importantly, the U.S. authorities are legally restricted from collecting the actual contents of 
Americans’ communications under the U.S. Constitution (although, as recent practice disclosed in the 
aftermath of Snowden’s disclosures indicates, this may not mean as much in practice).  However, 
government agencies are legally permitted to collect the contents (and metadata) of non-U.S. persons around 
the world without any prior judicial authorization. 
If the evidentiary value of a record in the digital environment is defined by its metadata, then we 
have something that is inextricably linked to the record.  Without metadata we do not have the record – 
we do not have evidence that is forensically sound and authentic.  As in the cases mentioned above, record-
level metadata is about dates, persons, and locations (MacNeil, 2002).  Without these we have no authentic 
evidence, but we can also argue that collection dates, names of persons, and locations is a violation of 
privacy.  That is: the context is content. 
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4 Problems with Binary Fourth Amendment Theory 
Legal definitions of privacy in the Fourth Amendment search context have often been crafted to force 
conclusions about potential privacy violations based on binary distinctions: either a form of investigation 
or information gathering by government agents constitutes a search or it does not (Kerr, 2013). The binary 
nature itself is not problematic – in fact it may be highly desirable. However, certain strict application of 
the third-party doctrine and the public/private dichotomy may improperly restrict Fourth Amendment 
protections of personal privacy. 
Traditional trespass-based decisions, recently reinvigorated by the Supreme Court’s decision in 
United States v. Jones (2012), have determined whether a search has occurred on the basis of whether a 
property interest has been infringed by a government agent.  The two-pronged Katz reasonable expectations 
of privacy test (which requires that 1) an individual must have exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy 
and, 2) that the expectation must be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable or legitimate) 
(Katz v. United States, 1967), despite the allure (or dangers) of its “hypothetical reasonable person” 
standard, has failed to modernize in pace with investigative technologies used by law enforcement around 
the country and remains subject to binary distinctions of legal significance.  Fourth Amendment law is 
riddled with binary distinctions granted legal significance by the courts, including the public/private 
dichotomy and the third-party doctrine (or the idea that once information is released to any third-party, 
privacy interests vis-à-vis the government, when acquiring the information from the third-party, are 
waived). 
Indeed, despite calling for empirical evidence (at least on its face) of societal expectations of privacy 
when examining the constitutionality of criminal investigations conducted by government agents, this 
hypothetical reasonable person has rarely (if ever) been a stand-in for relevant social science research on 
what members of the contemporary society actually expect(ed) (see Blumenthal, et al, 2009); rather courts 
have applied the test as a proxy for the work of social scientists and socio-legal scholars.  It has been 
suggested that the prevalence of binary dichotomies in Fourth Amendment case law is a consequence of 
courts (and lawyers) attempting to find “easy lines to draw in court” (Selbst, 2013).  However, the 
difficulties faced by the courts to apply the Katz test uniformly, problematic application of the third-party 
doctrine in cases involving government use of emerging technologies, and a resounding call by commentators 
that Fourth Amendment legal theory is in chaos (and has been for some time), suggest that the lines may 
not be as easy to draw at all.  Perhaps the time has come to rethink Fourth Amendment theory and reduce 
the legal significance of some of the problematic binary distinctions that have plagued court decisions for 
years, such as certain applications of the third-party doctrine that would lessen the privacy interests in 
certain types of metadata. 
In light of the opinions of the Justices in Jones, which signal the possibility that a majority of the 
Justices might be open to revisiting Fourth Amendment theory in light of modern technologically-aided 
police practices (Kerr, 2013), we argue for advancing a normative approach to privacy in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence that is sensitive to context (not bound by purely binary distinctions) and the 
increasingly revealing capacity of metadata surveillance, especially when such information is collected, 
stored, and mined in the aggregate. 
5 Defining and Defending Privacy 
Throughout this paper, we define informational privacy as the right to control access to and uses of personal 
information (Moore, 2010; 2007). This definition explicitly recognizes that individuals should have some 
rights to control not just access to personal information, but also some subsequent uses of that information 
(Moore, 2010), even after disclosure to third parties in certain circumstances. This definition will be informed 
by the mosaic theory of the Fourth Amendment (the idea that multiple searches for information by 
government agents, even if each is justified on its own, may become unjustified under the Fourth 
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Amendment by virtue of the greater intrusion made possible by aggregating and analyzing the information 
as a larger set, which may reveal patterns and sensitive information not obtainable through any individual 
search and potentially not relevant to the purposes of the individual searches themselves) recently 
considered in the wake of recent decisions in the United States v. Jones (2012) and United States v. Maynard 
(2010). This version of the mosaic theory, adopted from federal practices attempting to balance disclosing 
documents to the public under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) while preserving national security 
interests, is premised on the idea that any individual piece of information is generally less useful than when 
combined with other pieces of information.  We argue that a person’s right to limit access to and use of 
certain personal information (e.g. a person’s current or past geographic location) that has not been kept 
strictly “secret” (by virtue of the fact that is was available in a public space) should still, in some 
circumstances, remain legally enforceable under the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee of freedom from 
unreasonable search or seizure. 
In essence, we are arguing for a right to privacy in certain information (specifically metadata that 
forms an essential part of a record about an identifiable individual) that, when viewed discretely or in the 
aggregate is generally not qualitatively or quantitatively available to the public at large (or, as Judge 
Ginsburg of the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia phrased it, such information is not actually or 
constructively exposed to the public (United States v. Maynard, 2010)). The aggregation of the metadata 
associated with our electronic communications and digital records of our physical movements over a 
substantial time period allows law enforcement to easily discover information that is both qualitatively and 
quantitatively different than what is knowingly and voluntarily exposed to the public at large, even though 
it is (in essence) just an aggregation of distinct bits of information individually exposed to the public.  
Tracking a person’s cell phone or logging their Internet browsing patterns also allows the government to 
track individuals while they are inside a private building or in the sanctity of their homes – distinctly 
private information. 
In this pursuit, we will examine the proposition made by Justice Sotomayor in Jones that the time 
has come to rethink the legal significance of allowing a third party access to personal information when 
considering privacy interests in public spaces.  By restricting the third-party rule in our Fourth Amendment 
analysis, such that any release of information to a third party is not necessarily a complete and total waiver 
to all forms of access and use by anyone at all, we respect the drastic changes in technological possibilities 
and their proper role in government investigations while maintaining checks on improper abuse of authority. 
6 The Third Party Doctrine 
The third-party doctrine has been described as “the Fourth Amendment rule scholars love to hate” (Kerr, 
2009). For years, it has been subjected to voluminous amounts of criticism, both by legal scholars and state 
courts (Kerr, 2009).  The Supreme Court has upheld the rule, holding that citizens “assume the risk” that 
what they disclose to a third party will be transferred on to the government, but has not explicitly defended 
it (Kerr, 2009).  And now, after Jones, criticism of the rule has reached the Supreme Court itself. 
In its early years, the third-party doctrine was applied in cases involving undercover agents and 
confidential informants (Kerr, 2009). These cases held that defendants could not claim Fourth Amendment 
violations based off of conversations with government agents – sometimes wearing wires – because the “the 
Fourth Amendment does not protect ‘a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily 
confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it’” (Kerr, 2009, quoting Hoffa v. United States, 1966). In later cases, 
the Court applied the doctrine to business records.  In United States v. Miller (1978), the Supreme Court 
held that a bank depositor does not have any reasonable expectation of privacy in financial information (in 
the form of deposit slips, checks, and bank records) because such information was conveyed voluntarily to 
the bank and “exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business.”  As such, the court found 
that, 
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“The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be 
conveyed by that person to the Government.... [T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the 
obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, 
even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose 
and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed” (United States v. Miller, 1978). 
In her concurrence in United States v. Jones (2012), Justice Sotomayor stated that the time had come for 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to discard the premise that legitimate expectations of privacy could only 
be found in situations of near or complete secrecy.  Sotomayor argued that people should be able to maintain 
reasonable expectations of privacy in some information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. The opposite 
and historical view of the court, Sotomayor stated, was “ill-suited to the digital age, in which people reveal 
a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks” 
(United States v. Jones, 2012). Sotomayor considered that logs of phone calls, text messages, websites 
visited, email correspondence, purchase histories from online retailers, and geolocational information were 
all forms of information that were technically disclosed to third parties through mundane tasks, but where 
such disclosure should not constitute waiver of all privacy interests (United States v. Jones, 2012). 
“[W]hatever the societal expectations,” Sotomayor stated, these forms of information 
“can attain constitutionally protected status only if our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence ceases 
to treat secrecy as a prerequisite for privacy. I would not assume that all information voluntarily 
disclosed to some member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled 
to Fourth Amendment protection” (United States v. Jones, 2012). 
If one purpose of the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement is to prevent government agents from 
engaging in fishing expeditions then the third-party doctrine, when applied to aggregate collection and 
mining of metadata, would clearly frustrate the original purpose and intent of the Amendment itself.  
As stated by Justice Sotomayor, the situation with prolonged geolocational tracking is different 
precisely because the technological surveillance “evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law 
enforcement practices: ‘limited police resources and community hostility’” (United States v. Jones, 2012, 
citing Illinois v. Lidster, 2004) and allows the government to obtain personal information about individuals 
that is qualitatively and quantitatively different in kind than what would be discovered alternatively. The 
likelihood that, in the case of physical tailing, such a time consuming and resource intensive investigation 
would be carried out regularly without a sound basis is very small.  Police are very unlikely to devote such 
time and resources to this kind of visual surveillance except in cases that really warrant it. On the other 
hand, the ease and convenience of obtaining records from wireless providers could allow government agents 
virtually unfettered ability to conduct this sort of surveillance in a wide variety of cases, including “fishing 
expeditions” not based on any level of suspicion (probable cause or otherwise). 
However, this position could potentially limit some important investigations from proceeding as 
efficiently as they might have based purely on departmental lack of resources to conduct extensive visual 
surveillance. But requiring a warrant, based on affirmation of probable cause, before allowing government 
agents to collect and analyze such extensive digital information, should not be a serious impediment to 
most investigations and would help restrict this sort of surveillance to legitimate investigations. 
Additionally, other exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, such as the emergency 
doctrine (United States v. Goldenstein, 1972; Roberts, 1975), would continue to ameliorate these concerns 
in practice when time is of the essence. 
However, by limiting a strict application of the third-party doctrine, new questions emerge about 
where lines should be drawn between permissible and impermissible tactics in other contexts. For example, 
what are the important differences (if any) between aggregating geolocational information, bank records, 
“private” communication or messages on a social network like Facebook, web browsing or search histories, 
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or electronic purchase histories collected and archived over time?  The mosaic theory, originally announced 
by Judge Ginsburg in United States v. Maynard (2010), may begin to help us sort out these difficult 
questions. 
7 Public Surveillance, the Mosaic, and the Fourth Amendment 
Some scholars have claimed that recent (and even not so recent) advances in digital technologies and 
surveillance capabilities mean that we should rethink whether we can maintain any legitimate expectations 
of privacy while out in public – or in “public facts.” In United States v. Jones (2012), Justice Sotomayor 
proposed that the third-party doctrine should be abandoned (or at least rethought) in the face of confronting 
Fourth Amendment challenges related to investigative use of new technologies.  Justice Alito’s separate 
concurrence in that case expressed concern about the robustness of the “reasonable expectations of privacy 
test” – even while advocating its use in that case – because of the potential that the widespread use of new 
surveillance technologies could resign the populace to subjectively expect less privacy than should be 
afforded under the Constitution (United States v. Jones, 2012). 
Indeed, geolocational tracking technologies – which have now been used by law enforcement 
agencies for some time – allow law enforcement to easily compile thousands of pages of information about 
our present and past travels – in very exacting detail – and to mine that information indiscriminately for 
patterns (in United States v. Jones (2012), for example, prosecutors presented over 2,000 pages of data 
about Jones’s location over a 28 day period sourced from a physical tracking device installed in the rear 
bumper of a vehicle Jones regularly drove).  The NSA’s metadata surveillance practices, recently exposed 
to greater scrutiny by Edward Snowden, allow the government to conduct similar analysis with the calling 
and communications histories of everyday citizens, even those not suspected of committing any crime. 
Courts have also clearly stated that Fourth Amendment law has failed to keep pace with advancing 
technological possibilities. In one recent Ninth Circuit case, the court stated: 
“The extent to which the Fourth Amendment provides protection for the contents of electronic 
communications in the Internet age is an open question. The recently minted standard of electronic 
communication via e-mails, text messages, and other means opens a new frontier in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence that has been little explored” (Quon v. Arch Wireless, 2008).  
In United States v. Maynard (2010) (the predecessor Court of Appeals decision to United States v. Jones 
(2012)), the judge held that the government violated the suspects’ Fourth Amendment rights when they 
tracked a vehicle for 24 hours a day over a 28 day time-period. Importantly, while announcing the “mosaic 
theory”, the court found that: 
“…unlike one's movements during a single journey, the whole of one's movements over the course 
of a month is not actually exposed to the public because the likelihood anyone will observe all those 
movements is effectively nil… [and] the whole of one's movements is not exposed constructively even 
though each individual movement is exposed, because that whole reveals more—sometimes a great 
deal more—than does the sum of its parts” (United States v. Maynard, 2010). 
The court compared this case of prolonged modern surveillance with prior national security cases where the 
government regularly invoked the “mosaic theory” to shield certain otherwise public records from disclosure 
under the Freedom of Information Act because, “What may seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear of 
great moment to one who has a broad view of the scene” (United States v. Maynard, 2010, citing CIA v. 
Sims, 1985).  This concern was later voiced loudly by the Justices in the Supreme Court’s decision in United 
States v. Jones (2012), which upheld the decision of the Circuit Court (but on trespass grounds, rather than 
under the Katz reasonable expectations of privacy test). 
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Combining the third-party doctrine with the modern realities of massive data collection possible 
because of the ubiquitous nature of contemporary communications devices means that location data, even 
historical data, is becoming much easier for law enforcement to obtain without the need to secure a warrant 
supported by probable cause, even without planting physical devices and risking committing physical 
trespass. Indeed, the police in Jones did obtain historical geolocation information from Jones’s wireless 
provider, but chose to rely on the data collected through a physical tracking device installed on Jones’s 
vehicle during the trial. The present ability of law enforcement to so easily amass and mine such enormous 
amounts of personal information through simple technological tools and coordination with service providers 
(such as wireless service providers, email providers, or social network service providers) begs an examination 
of current Fourth Amendment theory, the reasonable expectations of privacy test, and the third-party 
doctrine. 
8 Finding a Legal Basis for Metadata Privacy 
Since Justice Harlan announced a two-part test in a concurring opinion in Katz v. United States (1967) in 
1967, whether or not a person maintains a right to privacy – for Fourth Amendment search purposes – is 
based on whether any subjective expectation of privacy maintained by the individual asserting the privacy 
interest is “one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable” (Katz v. United States, 1967).  Generally 
in the United States, courts have found that information released to the public could not be the subject of 
any legitimate expectation of privacy under this test. From 1967 until the United States v. Jones (2012) 
decision in 2012, the reasonable expectation of privacy test largely succeeded the prior focus on whether the 
government has violated a property right, such as by committing trespass, in conducting a search. Justice 
Scalia’s majority opinion in United States v. Jones (2012), however, reinvigorated the trespass doctrine for 
searches where physical trespass had occurred, while allowing for the continued use of the Katz test when 
non-trespassory interests are allegedly violated. 
Despite the radical shift that some of the dicta in the United States v. Jones (2012) decision might 
indicate for future of Fourth Amendment doctrine, Justice Sotomayor’s call for greater protections for some 
activity occurring in the public sphere is not the first time the idea has been suggested in the courts.  In 
the Katz v. United States (1967) decision itself, Justice Stewart stated that  
“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject 
of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area 
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected” (Katz v. United States, 1967). 
In that case, the government had placed a listening device to the exterior of a public phone booth, and had 
recorded the defendant making phone calls.  The court found that Katz maintained a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in his conversations while inside the phone booth, even though it was in a public place, because 
the court felt that  
“…a person in a telephone booth may rely upon the protection of the Fourth Amendment. One who 
occupies it, shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely 
entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world. 
To read the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has 
come to play in private communication” (Katz v. United States, 1967). 
The court continued it’s “discrediting” of the view that only trespass could raise constitutional questions, 
elaborating that  
“…once it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects people – and not simply ‘areas’ – 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, it becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment 
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cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure” (Katz 
v. United States, 1967). 
Reading this language alongside Sotomayor’s concurrence in United States v. Jones (2012), parallels begin 
to emerge.  The expectation that shutting the glass door to a public phone booth makes the conversation 
private is entirely consistent with the proposition that emails sent to an associate, purchase histories shared 
only with the online merchant, geolocational information shared only with a cellphone service provider,  or 
a social networking status update visible only to a select groups of friends (due to actively setting and 
maintaining privacy settings to ensure such limited publication), could also be considered legitimate 
contexts where a reasonable expectation of privacy vis-à-vis the government could adhere (Newell, 2011). 
However, the historical reliance on the third-party doctrine would presumably discredit these 
otherwise reasonable expectations merely because the information was disclosed to an intermediary (Google, 
Facebook, Verizon, T-Mobile, Amazon) or a select group of friends.  Thus, the government is free to demand 
and subpoena this information from these intermediaries without obtaining a warrant or attesting in court 
to probable cause. However, the “vital role” that the public telephone played in facilitating private 
communication (even in public spaces) in 1967 has been superseded by a variety of electronic wireless 
communications technologies (cell phones, email, text messaging, and private messaging on social media 
websites) that also collect and transmit a wealth of data (such as geographic coordinates) that find no easy 
corollary in the Katz analogy. 
Some lower federal courts have begun to question a strict application of the third-party doctrine as 
well.  In 2010, the Sixth Circuit addressed the question of whether the government violated the Fourth 
Amendment when agents compelled an ISP to turn over the contents of the defendant’s emails without first 
obtaining a warrant (United States v. Warshak, 2010). In that case, the Sixth Circuit held that, even though 
the subscriber agreement allowed the ISP to access the contents of its clients’ emails in certain 
circumstances, “the mere ability of a third-party intermediary to access the contents of a communication 
cannot be sufficient to extinguish a reasonable expectation of privacy” (United States v. Warshak, 2010). 
The court found that this conclusion was consistent with the Katz v. United States (1967) holding, because 
the telephone service company in the prior case also had a legal right to listen to phone calls in certain 
cases. 
The United States v. Warshak (2010) court also differentiated the facts in that case from those in 
United States v. Miller (1978), because the third-party ISP was merely an intermediary rather than the 
intended recipient (as the bank was in Miller).  Under the rationale in this case, the government could not 
demand the information from the intermediary corporation or service provider, but the conclusion would 
not necessarily extend to information released by the recipients of the communication, such as the email 
recipient or Facebook friend.  Whether this was the right result, or merely a step in the right direction, 
remains the subject of some controversy.  However, as evidenced by the recent indication by the five 
concurring justices in United States v. Jones (2012) (Sotomayor was the most explicit, but Alito’s opinion 
can also be read this way) that they may be willing to rethink Fourth Amendment theory (Slobogin, 2012), 
the time may be ripe for further challenges to precedent.  Indeed, the fact that the United States v. Jones 
(2012) decision followed from the introduction of the mosaic theory in the lower court’s decision signals 
that the justices may be willing to entertain this issue in coming years. 
The recognition of the Court in Katz v. United States (1967) itself of this relationship between the 
Fourth Amendment, private communications, and technological change, provides ample support for the 
proposition that these new forms of private communication (and the variety of additional opportunities 
they provide, both to government and individuals) should be carefully protected as well, preserving the idea 
that new technologies should receive carefully considered protections under the Fourth Amendment. 
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9 Conclusion 
In archival science, context is everything.  Metadata provides essential context for many records, especially 
digital records created by electronic communications and the use of digital devices like smartphones, 
computers, and tablets.  Context, as provided by metadata, is vital to the authenticity of these records.  
Without understanding where a record originated (when, by whom, where) by reference to certain metadata 
attached to that record, we cannot claim evidentiary or forensic authenticity – we want to understand the 
authenticity of a document so that we might understand the original act or fact.  That context, in the form 
of metadata, is for the most part inextricably linked to the digital record, means that a record does not 
properly exist (in an authentic state) without the metadata. 
Artificial legal distinctions between the content of electronic communications and the associated 
metadata do not properly respect the essential connection between these two sources of data.  These 
distinctions also obscure the reality that large-scale metadata surveillance and data-mining provide 
government agents with personal information about peoples’ communications that are often just as revealing 
as the actual words spoken – the “content” of a communication.  Because metadata surveillance can be 
highly intrusive to personal privacy and because certain types of record-level metadata (including dates, 
persons, and locations) are inextricably linked with the records of our digitally mediated lives, legal 
distinctions that draw a line between communications “content” and metadata are inappropriate and 
insufficient to adequately protect personal privacy.  The law should account for these deficiencies, and 
protect record-level metadata with the same protections as content – making metadata surveillance requests 
subject to judicial authorization under the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. After all: the context 
is content. 
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